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Context
Bart Penders




We expand upon the notion of the “credibility cycle” through a study of credibility engineering
by the food industry. Research and development (R&D) as well as marketing contribute to
the credibility of the food company Unilever and its claims. Innovation encompasses the
development, marketing, and sales of products. These are directed towards three distinct
audiences: scientific peers, regulators, and consumers. R&D uses scientific articles to create
credit for itself amongst peers and regulators. These articles are used to support health claims on
products. However, R&D, regulation, and marketing are not separate realms. A single strategy
of credibility engineering connects health claims to a specific public through linking that public
to a health issue and a food product.
1. Introduction
Scientific claims seem to have pervaded every corner of the world we live in. They are
used to support political argument, promote products of various types, and discipline
behavior. An important reason why scientific claims are used so abundantly is because
they are believed to be more “true” or “valuable” than other claims. Their value lies in
their credibility. It is, however, not always clear where that credibility comes from, how
it has emerged, or how it is maintained. This becomes even more striking when the
source of a scientific claim is not a knowledge producer we have grown accustomed
to, e.g. a university, a research institute, or a public research organization, but rather
1 Bart Penders is at the Centre for Society and Genomics and Department of Philosophy and Science Studies;
Institute for Science, Innovation and Society (ISIS), Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen and
the Department of Health, Ethics & Society (HES), School of Primary Care and Public Health (CAPHRI),
Maastricht University.
2 Annemiek P. Nelis is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the Science and Technology Studies Unit (SATSU),
University of York.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889711000202
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit Maastricht, on 22 Sep 2021 at 07:22:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
488 Bart Penders and Annemiek P. Nelis
a corporate laboratory. How and why does a for-profit knowledge producer produce
credible claims? In this paper, we describe some of the inner workings of the R&D
process of one corporate laboratory of the multinational company Unilever. We aim to
describe how, in corporate scientific practices, credibility is engineered among nutrition
scientists and among consumers and how both those processes are intertwined.
Credibility engineering influences the research agenda of corporate and academic
science alike, mostly, because it is thought to influence food and other consumption
choices made by consumers. Independent scholars from areas such as nutrition science,
food policy and health law, have all argued, on the basis of empirical research, that this
influence is morally questionable (e.g. Lang and Haesman 2004; Nestle 2002; Simon
2006). Such critical inquiries into the normative and political consequences of credibil-
ity engineering and the ensuing consequences for public health are worthwhile because
they display how corporate research influences our lives in unseen ways. The insights
into credibility engineering presented in this paper will fuel future analyses in this area.
One of the themes of our research project is how the “credibility economy” of food
products is established and maintained by the food industry. We are interested in this
perspective for two reasons. First, we want to explore how food industry deals with the
“public credibility market” and how both scientific knowledge and – for lack of a better
term – “lay knowledge” intersect in this context. How does the food industry manage
innovation in a scientific world known for its diverse and heterogeneous character and
a consumer population that is, allegedly, looking for a healthy diet and responsible
food? Secondly, we wanted to ask ourselves what science and technology studies (STS)
could learn about industrial R&D. Studies within STS have focused almost exclusively
on knowledge production in public laboratories. Little attention has been paid to the
knowledge production that exists beyond the academic laboratory: for-profit science
or corporate science. Such corporate laboratories remain understudied (Penders et al.
2009; Shapin 2008).
In the past two years, starting early 2008, we have studied Unilever R&D as a
site of corporate science. Unilever is a large multinational company producing and
selling consumer goods in more than 150 countries. Its annual turnover is almost 40
billion euros and its 2009 profit was approximately 3.6 billion. It employs more than
175,000 people, 6000 of whom are researchers in 6 research centers, and the R&D
headquarters is based in Vlaardingen, the Netherlands. The annual research budget is
close to one billion euros (Unilever 2009b). In order to be able to study the internal
dynamics of such a big organization, we have selected a number of cases drawn from
the Unilever R&D laboratories and offices at Vlaardingen and elsewhere in Europe,
focusing in particular on Unilever as a food company (and in this article even narrower,
as a margarine producer).3 One of these cases, margarine, is the topic of this paper.
3 Cases were selected in dialogue with Unilever R&D management. They include “healthy margarines,” the
topic of this paper, “ice structuring protein” and “metabolomics,” two cases that are currently being studied
and will be reported in future publications.
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While we acknowledge that its business activities range much further, the Dutch roots
of the multinational can be traced back to margarine, a product which provided us
with an interesting case-study.
Unilever has allowed us access to the relevant personnel, laboratories, offices,
and archives. We have conducted in-depth interviews with Unilever researchers,
research managers, and project managers (eleven in total),4 observed meetings, and
visited laboratories and offices. We have watched and discussed television commercials,
marketing, and communication strategies and innovation portfolios.5 To ensure that a
critical distance to the object of study could be maintained, only one of the authors,
Bart Penders, collected empirical material, while the other author, Annemiek P. Nelis,
remained outside the food industry. The empirical material was subsequently analyzed
by Bart Penders and discussed and evaluated by both authors and regularly presented
to audiences both familiar and unfamiliar with corporate knowledge production.
Ultimately, from this diverse set of empirical material, we developed the analysis
presented here.
We will start by revisiting the study of credibility and the credibility cycle as it was
proposed by Latour and Woolgar in 1979. Subsequently, we will describe the process
of credibility engineering that we have observed in Unilever’s R&D and marketing
sections and determine whether the 1979 credibility cycle also fits for-profit knowledge
production. As we advance through our empirical description of Unilever’s credibility
engineering with respect to margarine and phytosterols, we will adjust the credibility
cycle when required. We will conclude with an updated credibility cycle, suitable for
studying for-profit knowledge production and credibility engineering.
2. Studying credibility
In 1975, Randall Collins pictured science as “an open plain with men scattered
throughout it, shouting: ‘Listen to me! Listen to me! . . . The fundamental process
is a competition for attention” (Collins 1975, 480). In scientific practices, shouting
harder does not always get you more attention. Getting noticed requires an attribute
that makes one stand out from the crowd, so to speak. In science, the chosen attribute
is credibility or reputation. Reputation “highlights one’s presence in the . . . world”
(van Lente and Rip 1998).
4 Interviews were conducted in Dutch and English, determined by the native tongue of the interviewee (which,
in the cases of Unilever R&D is in no way correlated to the Dutch or British research laboratories or offices).
All interview fragments from Dutch interviews have been translated by Bart Penders. Fragments drawn from
interviews and presented here are exemplary of the types of arguments used or types of statements uttered by
the interviewees.
5 While Unilever previously cooperated with scholarly inquiry into its history (e.g. Fieldhouse 1978; Jones 2005;
Wilson [1954/1968] 1970; Wubs 2008), studying its present has been a novel experience to Unilever too.
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In the often quoted article, “Cordelia’s Love,” Shapin describes how, starting
in the mid-seventies with people like Randall Collins, STS scholars have studied
the “credibility economy” alongside the study of (scientific) knowledge. Scientific
knowledge requires more than being heard or talking the truth, rather it requires being
accepted by others as credible source of knowledge. “In sociological terms of art, an
individual’s belief (or an individual’s claim) was contrasted to collectively held knowledge.
The individual’s belief did not become collective – and so a part of knowledge – until
and unless it had won credibility. No credibility no knowledge” (Shapin 1995, 257).6
Credibility is neither self-evident nor a permanent attribute of scientific claims.
As science studies scholars have repeatedly demonstrated, it requires maintenance and
active support to construct, gain, and uphold credibility. Existing studies of credibility
have shown this work in different contexts, focusing for example on forensic science
in the courtroom (Bal 2005; Lynch 2002), contested infrastructural projects (Perry
et al. 2007), the emergence of ecology as a scientific discipline (Kinchy and Kleinman
2003), or the development of human growth hormone (Latour and Woolgar [1979]
1986). What these studies have in common is that they show credibility engineering
as a continuous process.
Shapin (1995) lists three characteristics of the study of credibility. The first of these
states that scientific claims are effective not because they resemble the truth but rather
because they have gained credibility: scientific claims are no different from claims in
ordinary life. The second states that there is no limit to the considerations that might
be relevant to accruing credibility. As a result, there is no limit to what could be taken
into consideration to understand credibility. The third states that there is not one single
theory of how credibility is achieved. Rather this may differ in each case and can and
will be rather diverse.
Let us briefly turn to Unilever to consider these points. First of all, as we will
see throughout this paper, credibility is clearly an issue for Unilever. Within the
company we encountered people talking about “credibility” all the time. Credibility
was, for example, related to scientific claims as well as to marketing and corporate
identity. In the words of a senior R&D product leader: “As a part of society, when
we communicate we are influencing our credibility. Others judge that credibility. To
have and to keep credibility is the hardest job of all” (Observation V2, 20081209).
The second of Shapin’s characteristics states that anything can be relevant for obtaining
scientific credibility. This is not limited to a particular setting or repertoire. Unilever
deals with competing claims about evidence and effects concerning nutrition, food, and
health on a daily basis. As we will show, credibility for the acclaimed effect of products
is obtained through a variety of means: peer-review accreditation by international food
agencies, advertising, key-opinion leaders, and endorsement by celebrities. The third
6 One of the classical papers in the sociology of science argues that past recognition and allocation of credibility
produce accumulative advantage, such that they accrue at ever higher rates, particularly compared to those
judged less so in the past. Merton identifies this as “The Matthew Effect in Science” (Merton 1968).
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889711000202
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit Maastricht, on 22 Sep 2021 at 07:22:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Credibility Engineering in the Food Industry 491
guideline implies that empirical study will reveal how credibility engineering works
in practice. Rather than the employment of a particular theory, to understand the
credibility economy of Unilever’s products and markets, we had to study margarine
and the claims that surround it in detail. As mentioned above, STS studied knowledge
production mostly within public settings. Our study of Unilever R&D reveals the
production of credible claims in a commercial setting. While at first sight this may
appear to resemble well-studied public research practices, upon close examination they
turn out to be significantly different. Claims, we will show, emerge at the intersection
of science, marketing, and (the building of) a corporate image.7
3. Revisiting credibility
One of the first studies that touched upon “credibility’ as a resource for the production
of scientific knowledge, has been Laboratory Life of Latour and Woolgar (1979). In
this book, Latour and Woolgar show what scientists do to make their claims become
uncontested “truths” and how they enable further research by strengthening their
reputation and – on the basis of this reputation – funding. The cyclical process that
Latour and Woolgar describe includes the conversion or, in their words, translation,
from proposals to money to data to results to recognition and back to proposals again.
This is the “credit cycle” of science.
Latour and Woolgar first coined “the cycle of credit” in 1979. Given the central role
of recognition and prestige in the credit cycle, it has also been named the “credibility
cycle” (van Lente and van Til 2008; Packer and Webster 1996). According to Latour
and Woolgar, time, money, and effort are translated into data. Sets of data are used to
construct a line of argumentation, which is subsequently written down in publications.
Scientific peers will either notice or read the publication, or even cite it, which will
result in (additional) recognition for the claim in that publication that cites it. The
newfound or heightened recognition transferred to the author can be mobilized to
support new funding requests. The new funding, supplemented with time and effort,
will eventually result in new data. Every step in this cycle contributes to the credibility
of the knowledge claims produced, the researchers involved and/or the group or
laboratory in which the work has been done. If maintained successfully, this cycle will
uphold the credibility of each of these. The cycle of Latour and Woolgar has been
7 While there have been few studies of knowledge production in commercial settings, at least one example is
worth mentioning here. This is Sismondo’s study of pharmaceutical knowledge production (Sismondo 2007,
2009a, 2010). Sismondo describes how pharmaceutical companies today organize medical research and in
particular clinical trials through so-called consultant research organizations (CROs). These organizations form
an invisible workforce of research planners that nonetheless work hard to maintain both their own and their
companies’ credibility. In line with Sismondo, whose work we revisit in the conclusions to this paper, we will
argue that corporate science and marketing are both important sources for building credibility and that rather
than treating them as different parts of credibility engineering, they are in fact intimately intertwined.
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Fig. 1. The “cycle of credit” or “credibility cycle” by Latour and Woolgar. Redrawn, based
upon Latour and Woolgar [1979] 1986.
summed up in a famous drawing (fig. 1). This cycle is described by Latour and Woolgar
in terms of capital investments. Central to this capital investment are accepted scientific
conventions such as academic publications and the process of peer-review.
Inspired by the work of Latour and Woolgar, several scholars have shown slightly
different cycles of credibility engineering, such as the credibility-process that comes
with patenting practices (Packer and Webster 1996): research councils and their agendas
(Rip 1994), the pursuit of societal relevance (Hessels et al. 2009), and funding agencies
and their portfolios (Nowotny et al. 2001). In some of these studies additional elements
have been added to the original credibility cycle. Packer and Webster (1996), for
example, have studied patenting cultures of university scientists in the UK. Based upon
surveys, interviews and observations, they demonstrate that next to the cycle of credit
centered around academic-peer-reviewed publications, a second cycle – centered on
patents – may emerge. While credibility is constructed and maintained inside both
these cycles, transferring credibility from one cycle to the other turned out to be less
simple. To Packer and Webster this indicated that credibility engineering takes place in
two distinct social worlds: academic peer-review and legal patents. The transfer from
one to the other was only partly possible and required a lot of work.
Lehenkari has studied margarine innovation in Finland and the United States, also
departing from Latour and Woolgar’s credibility cycle. He describes how during the
development of Benecol margarine, negotiations took place between actors outside and
inside the innovation network. The producer of Benecol, the Finnish Raiso Margarine,
occupied the passage point between outside and inside – thus being granted credit for
the function and success of the product (Lehenkari 2000). He identifies three cycles,
one taking place during product development, another during commercialization in
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Finland, and a third during commercialization in the United States. Lehenkari separates
the cycles temporally from one another and reserves a grand role for scientific evidence,
even in convincing consumers. He refers to mass media as a vehicle for careful and
balanced reporting of this evidence, and shows the heterogeneous network Raiso
Margarine built, in order to build credibility for this evidence with the general public
(Lehenkari 2003).
While the patenting culture studied by Packer and Webster touches on private
actors, their study was mostly limited to public laboratories. Lehenkari did study a
network centering on a corporate actor, but does not explicitly aim to align the
credibility cycle with corporate science. Here we will address if and how credibility
engineering in corporate science differs from publicly funded science. Who are the
audiences or targets of credibility in corporate science? Is achieving a credible status for
a claim different in for-profit science? Departing from the credibility cycle as shown
in figure 1 and discussed above, the sections below will sketch the context in which
credibility engineering takes place in corporate science. We will start with some of the
key-elements of Latour and Woolgar’s credibility cycle, looking at the role of science,
scientific articles, and peer-review in Unilever R&D. In subsequent sections we will
gradually move from scientific peers, via regulators to consumers and marketing and
show how both science and marketing produce credible claims about food products.
4. Credibility among peers
Each year, Unilever scientists publish hundreds of articles in peer reviewed journals.8
This is not a small number and requires much effort. Articles do not publish themselves.
Drawing from our own experience as academic authors, as well as from the literature
on scientific work and publishing practices, we recognize that Unilever must commit
significant resources to generate these publications. Throughout our observations and
interviews, however, we are constantly reminded that the production of academic
output is not the core task of Unilever R&D. Nevertheless, Unilever is willing to
conduct and pay for this work. One of the Unilever R&D supervisors explained that
“the goal of publishing is to maintain our prestige in the scientific world” (Interview
V2, 20081006). This prestige is not sought after because of any intrinsic value, as one
of the Unilever scientists explains, but serves several strategic goals:
We have a slightly different goal [compared to universities] when it comes to all sorts
of external linkages, collaborations and publications. [To] us, publications can be purely
8 A Scopus search of Unilever as an author affiliation revealed 330, 377, 372, and 301 articles published in
2009, 2008, 2007, and 2006 respectively. Overall, Scopus lists over 7800 articles in which Unilever is listed
as the affiliation of one or more authors (checked February 4, 2010). While many of the articles represent
public-private collaborations, others list Unilever as the affiliation of the sole, lead, or all authors.
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directed towards reputation, or they serve as evidence base for certain claims we make
accompanying certain products. It requires referring to peer reviewed data. Additionally
[publications help] in being credible towards certain external partners. (Interview V4,
20081215)
The scientist quoted here gives three goals for the production of scientific
publications. First, publications aid in establishing one’s reputation as a knowledge
producer. Second, scientific publications provide support for product claims in the
market place. And third, scientific publications increase the credibility of the company,
something that is important if others judge the value of the work that Unilever does.
With respect to the latter, another Unilever scientist explains:
[An] important reason to participate in the academic circus of publications is to enter
certain circles of key opinion formers, people who have influence in or on the field
nutrition and medicine. To be a credible partner to them, one needs to invest in, as well
as deliver high quality work. Most of the partners we cooperate with are not dependent
on the money we invest in such a collaboration. One has to be an interesting partner,
asking interesting questions and performing good [science]. We try to show through
peer-reviewed publication that we are able to. We show that we are an equal partner
. . . . We try to publish high quality work, which gets us invited to conferences and to
universities. That makes us a partner. (Interview V5, 20081215)
Next to the three motivations mentioned earlier, a fourth reason to publish in peer
reviewed journals has to do with human resource management within Unilever:
One can wonder “what does it help us, to be a well-respected partner?” Well, we do want
to attract the best people. [Annually,] we hire at least 30 to 40 scientists, in Vlaardingen
alone . . . . We do want to select from the candidates with the highest quality. The people
who want to work here . . ., we have to be able to offer them interesting questions. Call
it a “license to operate,” that is a phrase we use once in a while . . . . If we do not do
it, everything comes [crashing] down and one cannot uphold one’s status as a serious
research-based company. (Interview V5, 20081215)
Actively pursuing peer reviewed publications is reported to grant Unilever access to
external knowledge producers, either as potential employees, or as potential partners.
Like others, Unilever depends on interaction with other knowledge producers to
produce knowledge of its own. A Unilever scientist explains: “If we publish high-
quality work, this will lead to more prestige, which [will in turn lead to] more contact,
more possibilities and more access to the global scientific world . . . . If we get access
to five renowned scientists that is more expertise than we have ourselves” (Interview
V2, 20081006). Thus, prestige amongst scientists is a requirement for Unilever’s ability
to access expertise, either through contacts or through recruitment. The supporters
enrolled in a coalition, or collaboration, can also be a source of prestige (Smith et al.
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2005) and maintaining prestige is important to Unilever’s ability to innovate, for it
maintains Unilever’s position among other knowledge producers. This maintenance
is performed through academic output including scholarly articles, but also through
lectures given at universities, awarding research prizes and public-private co-operations.
The latter often consists of post-doctoral researchers or PhD students who work at
Unilever R&D Vlaardingen. In the Netherlands, regular scientific publishing is a
requirement for obtaining a PhD degree and Unilever R&D enables and actively
supports this publishing requirement.
Although it is reasonable to assume that, given the existence of formal evaluation
mechanisms (e.g. peer review), both corporate science and academic science should
be treated equally, this is not always the case. As some complain: “[I]t is unscientific,
as well as unfair, to discard or discount a study based solely on which investigator or
institution conducted or funded it” (Barrow and Conrad 2006). However, Unilever
is well aware that industrial science does not occupy the same societal and political
niche as academic science (Interview V2, 20081006 and Observation V1, 20080415).
As we will show, it carefully orchestrates its reputation amongst its many peers, acting
upon a conviction that credibility is important and thus attempting to construct itself
as credible as possible (Perry et al. 2007).
Engineering credibility amongst academic peers starts by setting up collaborations,
publishing peer reviewed articles and by “forming networks of key-opinion formers”
(Observation V1, 20081110). Key opinion formers (KOF) can be prominent scientists
or policy makers. They are identified by Unilever based upon their expected ability to
influence public opinion. For as far as KOF are scientists, Unilever R&D attempt
to mobilize their expertise. This is done either by consulting them directly at
conferences, meetings, or via telephone calls, by reading their scientific publications,
or by paying close attention to their non-academic actions, which may include
television appearances, columns they write or letters they publish in newspapers.
As one of the Unilever scientists claims “Traditionally, Unilever has always wanted
to stay really close to the key opinion formers” (Observation V7, 20081110).9 Key
opinion formers co-determine “whether evidence is admissible or legitimate. They
determine proof of product” (Observation V7, 20081110; emphasis in original). To make
sure that products and claims released by Unilever are accepted amongst academic
peers, Unilever scientists actively engage with and consult (scientific) key opinion
formers.
Briefly summarizing the four motivations for peer-reviewed publishing, we can
recognize (1) the construction of prestige, (2) support for product claims, (3) enabling
network building, and (4) self portrayal as a science-minded employer. When we
consider these motivations with respect to the credibility cycle of Latour and Woolgar,
this part of the activities of Unilever very much resembles knowledge production in
9 This scientist continues to argue that this will act as a hurdle to innovation because it favors conservatism.
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a public laboratory (from the perspective of a company): the construction of prestige
or recognition, the desire to build networks with peer knowledge producers, and the
need to strengthen credibility through subsequent projects. Unilever, however, also is
different from the laboratory culture described by Latour and Woolgar. To Unilever,
peers are important not only because they review scientific texts, they also judge claims
in the context of regulatory practices.
5. Regulatory gains
Product claims range from statements of safety (safe to consume, apply to skin, etc.),
to compliance, to regulations (safety regulations, content and packaging regulations,
etc.), to health or functionality claims (e.g. “lowers your cholesterol”) and much more.
Such claims can also be found beyond the food industry, for instance accompanying
cosmetics, cars, or lawnmowers. Often, such claims are checked and approved by
regulatory bodies.
The evidence required to legally allow Unilever to use health claims on nutrition
in the member states of the European Union, is judged by the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA), which assembles expert panels to issue a “scientific opinion” on
these proposed health claims. The final decision lies with national organizations dealing
with food safety and admissibility, in the Netherlands this is the Voedsel en Waren
Autoriteit (VWA). The VWA or its sister organizations across Europe will receive the
scientific opinion of the EFSA and let their decision be guided by it. The EFSA expert
panels consist of academic scientists, some of which are key-opinion formers.
The EFSA Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition, and Allergies is an ad-hoc
committee assembled to weigh evidence presented by companies who wish to
accompany food products with health claims. In 2008 this Panel answered “Question
No EFSA-Q-2008-085.” This Question was presented by Unilever (EFSA 2008)
through the publication of a “scientific opinion.” Both question and opinion deal
with the health effects of plant sterols. They address health claims connected to the
sterols-in-product-context, not connected to specific product brands. This means that
other food producers will also be able to use a similar claim for a similar product.
The Unilever products that contain plant sterols and which are the most likely to
be accompanied by this particular health claim, are the Flora/Becel proActiv brand
categories of margarine.
Unilever scientists assembled evidence in a lengthy health-claim dossier. Part of this
evidence is drawn from literature and part the result of (as yet) unpublished studies by
Unilever itself. The whole collection is subsequently handed over to EFSA and the
panel writes a scientific opinion weighing this evidence. Afterwards, the results appear
in the EFSA Journal, and in this particular case, also appeared in many newspapers in
the Netherlands and the rest of Europe. Alongside the evidence, Unilever proposed
the following potential wording for their health claim:
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Plant sterols have been proven to lower/reduce blood cholesterol significantly. Blood
cholesterol lowering has been proven to reduce the risk of (coronary) heart disease.
Plant sterols are proven to lower/reduce blood cholesterol significantly. Blood cholesterol
lowering is proven to reduce the risk of (coronary) heart disease.
Product x contains (added) plant sterols proven to lower/reduce blood cholesterol. Blood
cholesterol lowering reduces/has been proven/shown to reduce the risk of (coronary) heart
disease (EFSA 2008, 6).
The EFSA panel ruled that none of these options were entirely correct and that a
different framing “reflects the scientific evidence” better (ibid., 9):
Plant sterols have been shown to lower/reduce blood cholesterol. Blood cholesterol lowering
may reduce the risk of (coronary) heart disease. (Ibid.)
If one compares the definitive wording as decided by the panel to the suggested
wording by Unilever, the differences are small, yet substantial. How did this panel
motivate this specific rewording and why are these differences so important?
In the case of Flora/Becel proActriv, the EFSA panel argues that studies “have
indicated a causal relationship between elevated LDL-cholesterol and CHD” (EFSA
2008) and “there is evidence that the risk of CHD is reduced by cholesterol lowering
therapy . . ., including dietary intervention” (EFSA 2008).10 Nevertheless, the panel
motivates the rewording of the health claim by the observation that “there are no human
intervention studies demonstrating that plant sterols reduce the risk of coronary heart
disease” (EFSA 2008, 8). While in pharmaceutical testing randomized clinical trials
are considered the golden standard, in nutrition science usually “human intervention
studies” fulfill this role:
Human intervention studies are the hardest because they are the least controllable.
However. . . at the same time they are still, as my nutritionist-colleagues will confirm, the
golden standard: double-blind, placebo-controlled. If you can show an effect that way,
and you are able to repeat it, you end with the strongest possible backing for a claim.
(Interview V4, 20081215)
10 This “scientific evidence” reflects a compromise reached by a number of peers, referring to evidence of
blood cholesterol lowering in the general population. Evidence is presented in the form of claims such as “the
daily intake of 2 to 2.4 g/d of plant sterols or stanols added to margarine . . . reduced on average low density
lipoprotein (LDL) blood cholesterol levels by 8.9% (95% CI: 7.4–10.5)” (EFSA 2008, 8; Katan, Grundy, Jones,
Law, Miettinen and Paoletti 2003). Rephrased, this tells us that 95 per cent of the people who consume between
2 and 2.4 grams of plant sterols through daily margarine consumption had their blood cholesterol lowered
between 7.4 and 10.5 per cent. To the average European, this would result in a blood cholesterol level lowering
of 8.9 per cent. It is this average European which is addressed in the proposed and accepted health claim and
who is reflected in the evidence as judged by the panel.
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While evidence may exist and studies may have been conducted, the “proper
scientific character” of the evidence is highest in the human intervention study. Claims
thus have to be backed by “the gold standard” for the panel to legitimize the original
wording.11 Due to the lack of a particular human intervention study, the claim will
have to be ‘toned down’: blood cholesterol lowering may reduce CHD.
The panel’s advice is relatively positive, especially considering that the wording was
revised only slightly as compared to a large number of health claims which were checked
simultaneously and were considered not attainable, given the provided evidence. In this
case, Unilever has been relatively successful in establishing the credibility of its claim
in this peer forum:
EFSA, the ways it works now, is forming a filter for [product or health] claims. Currently,
a huge number of claims circulate and it is expected that more than three quarters
will end up in the dustbin [due to EFSA regulations]. That our claims have been
approved or have been awarded for the most part provides us with a competitive
advantage. Simultaneously it acknowledges our science. EFSA has become a credibility
filter. (Observation V1, 20090123; emphasis added)
Unilever acknowledges EFSA as an institution able to grant credibility to claims
and pursues a positive scientific opinion from them.12 EFSA’s positive judgment
has, however, not resulted in complete consensus. Despite EFSA’s judgment and the
evidence provided by Unilever, in some scientific circles some disagreement regarding
the claims connected to Flora/Becel proactive remains.13
Unilever’s interaction with EFSA about the health claim connected to plant sterols
and stanols deals with a single claim. Establishing the credibility of that one claim trans-
fers a little credibility to the claimant, Unilever. Interestingly, just as with the credibility
cycle described by Latour and Woolgar, it is in fact a small group of people “doing”
the engineering and acquiring the credibility: authors on publications are identi-
fied first by their names and second by their affiliation. It is only though the continuous
engineering of credible claims and the continuous exchange of credibility between
claim and claimant that the credibility of Unilever itself can be strengthened (as
11 In the context of nutrition science, a strict 5-step hierarchy of scientific evidence has been proposed by the
ANZFA (now Food Standards Australia New Zealand) (see Truswell 2001 for a critical discussion).
12 The formalized regulatory status and role of EFSA, as well as the willingness of the European food industry
to cooperate with it, suggests that nutrition science may follow medicine into a field in which objectivity,
authority and credibility emerge from a regulatory framework that follows an internal ratio of evidence
production (Cambrosio et al. 2006). The importance of EFSA in credibility engineering is also demonstrated
when companies such as Winclove and Danone, retract all their dossiers before EFSA was able to support or
deny them – to avoid any bad publicity, harmful to the credibility of the submitted claims.
13 For instance, studies report disturbed metabolism caused by plant sterols (Gylling et al. 2009) or warn of
impaired endothelial function and potential brain injury (Weingärtner et al. 2008).
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Fig. 2. The cycle of credibility of corporate science in academia. Despite a few different
names and labels, the essence of credibility engineering is unaltered. The main expansion is the
mobilization of articles and arguments for product claim support: a move into the regulatory
domain.
mentioned in section 4). A single credible claim does not make the claimant credible –
this requires repetition and repeated transfer. The large amount of data produced
and articles published (cf. note 8) as well increasing numbers of health claim dossiers
submitted, continuously feeds Unilever’s credibility cycle. In order to generate as few
as possible hurdles for this credibility transfer, no subdivisions of Unilever R&D are
listed on publications. It is just “Unilever R&D” or “Unilever Research Labs.”
Figure 2 shows the cycle of credibility as it exists regarding Unilever R&D. The
labels are slightly different, but the essence of engineering credibility among academic
peers remains unchanged. Certainly, Unilever’s pursuit of credibility is also a cycle
which sustains Unilever’s ability to do R&D. Prestige enables contacts and access
to (new) knowledge, which enables certain innovation trajectories and knowledge
output, which in turn sustains prestige or recognition. However, the mobilization of
scientific knowledge in the realm of European food regulations warrants an expansion
of the credibility cycle beyond immediate peers to include this second audience:
regulators.
Regulators enhance the credibility of Unilever’s claim that, for instance, phytosterols
in margarine spreads may reduce blood cholesterol, by judging and approving of it.
Subsequently, credibility is transferred to Unilever itself. Because of this it is of great
importance to Unilever and the food industry generally that the regulators themselves
are highly credible. Considering the central role regulators play in translating scientific
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credibility into consumer credibility, a highly credible EFSA (or equivalent in other
countries) is in their best interest.14
Despite this expansion of the credibility cycle (shown in fig. 2), for a company
like Unilever, this cycle is far from complete. If credibility were restricted to scientists,
R&D professionals, and regulators, this would mean an omission of the essence of a
corporation. The goal of Unilever is not to “do R&D” or to generate knowledge. It
is to sell products. To do so, credibility amongst consumers is what is really needed:
“What ultimately matters most, is the credibility towards the consumer. That is plain
and simple. He will have to buy it. Credibility towards scientists is a means to that
end. Towards our customers, supermarkets, and the like, we need to have the same
relationship” (Observation V2, 20081209).
6. Credibility among consumers
As a global food producer, Unilever produces, sells, and markets foods worldwide.
An increasing number of these products is accompanied by claims. These can be, for
instance, claims about the product’s content (e.g. sugar free) or claims concerning its
health effects (e.g. lowers cholesterol). As described above, under current regulations
such claims require expert approval. Nevertheless, even when a health claim has been
tested and approved, consumers may not always find these claims relevant. During one
of our discussions, dealing with claims about cognitive and mental enhancement that
would be induced by vitamins and mineral additives, one of the R&D managers reports
that “such claims are plausible to the people [in India and Indonesia] and they believe
that a rich source of iron and other minerals may generate such effects. In Europe, this
is different because consumers know that they are well fed, so why would this [small
change] have such a large effect? It is about understanding what consumers consider
credible.”15 Lack of credibility amongst consumers will quickly translate into loss of sales
and profits.
One particular risk to the credibility of claims and companies is when claims are
being contested. Diets for example, in a number of occasions, have been the topic of
fierce disputes. Steven Shapin has compared the credibility of nutrition science and
scientists with the credibility of authors of popular diet books and methods. As Shapin
rightly observes, the prescriptions of nutrition scientists are often rejected or ignored
14 As EFSA was initially set up, and more specifically when regulatory structures had to be designed with respect
to dealing with health claims in Europe, EFSA approached, among others, the food industry to design such
regulations (Observation V1, 20090123). Interestingly, the entanglement of the food industry’s and EFSA’s
credibility need not necessarily be understood as a conflict of interest in this case, but may alternatively be
perceived as a shared interest, as one of the Unilever research directors argues: “The credibility of EFSA’s
scientific committee needs to be guarded” (Observation V1, 20090123).
15 Interestingly, the word “credible” was used in English in this interview conducted in Dutch. Interview V2,
20081006.
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while the prescriptions uttered by authors of diet books, including Atkins (with a diet
named after himself), Agatston (the South Beach diet), Tarnower (the Scarsdale diet),
Bakker (the Dutch, Sonja Bakkeren), are taken up with much enthusiasm: “[they are]
the ones who are clearly winning in the marketplace of dietary credibility” (Shapin
2007, 180). The authors of do-it-yourself methods are more successful in engineering
credibility for their dietary approach than nutrition scientists. Shapin suggests that
they use a particular strategy for taming the contested nature of claims: a case-based
approach.
While nutrition science is based on universal claims and knowledge that is or should
be universally valid, best-selling books make use of the opposite: they describe the
particular, making use of individual cases and stories. Dr. Atkinson for example, describes
the story of Mrs Finkenstein, Stanley Moskowitz, and Mary Anne Evans, each being a
particular age, living under particular circumstances and suffering from particular health
problems. These three individuals allow for easy identification for the general public.
Nutrition science, on the other hand, deals with populations, with the average men or
women and with statistical figures that are epidemiologically sound and meaningful.
Such figures do not translate easily into individual risks or gains. “The problem,
however, is that people tend to be interested in what is likely to happen to them. The
answer for any specific individual will either be colon cancer or no colon cancer, die
before age 75 or after age 75” (ibid., 184–185).
Unilever not only makes use of the scientific repertoire that lingers on universal
claims (such as induced by the regulatory framework of ESFA) but also uses case-
based approaches. Their main marketing strategy for example, is centered on a set
of propositions concerning life and health, called the “life goal model.” This model
consists of 6 goals for life that have been formulated on the basis of market research
(see table 1). The goals are expected to guide all activity within Unilever, including
R&D and marketing. Each of these life goals is connected to one or more of Unilever’s
particular brands and brand families. The goals are articulated by an expression in
the first person (“I”). This first person perspective reveals personal focus, a case-study
approach. Take for instance the life goal healthy for longer. It is connected to brands such
as Bertolli and Flora/Becel and is expressed through the phrase: “If I’m going to live
longer, I want to stay fit. My heart, my body and all my senses need to stay strong.
If I take care of my body, my long-term health will take care of itself” (Banga 2006).
Unlike, for instance, the EFSA scientific opinion, there is neither talk of the average
European, nor the average consumer whatsoever. The key is in the “I”. Together with
Unilever, we have moved into the realm of marketing, and marketing is all about being
personal.
Let’s look closer at one of the marketing strategies as it is presented by Unilever.
For symmetrical purposes we will be using the same product as above: Flora/Becel
proActiv margarine. Communication with consumers is generally done via well-known
marketing channels: advertisements on television, in magazines, and, increasingly, on
the internet. Those attempting to change eating habits often do so by means of mass
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Table 1. Unilever has focused its actions around a number of key focal areas or brand
categories (the Life Goal Model). These areas are repeatedly identified with particular brands,
as listed. Connected to these focal areas, key expressions, fitting a logic of the particular, are
used again and again. These can be found at many places, sites and documents in marketing
practices or research. A readily available public source, is for instance Banga (2006).
Life Goal Brands Key Phrase
Give Children a
Good Start
Flora/Becel, Planta I want my children to have the best possible
lives. And a big part of that is making sure
they eat good food, helping their bodies
and minds develop strongly.
Be Free from Health
Problems
Oral Care So many people have food-related problems –
allergies, intolerances, diabetes, irritable
bowel syndrome, the list goes on. I don’t
want that – I want solutions today to lead a
happy, healthy life.
Healthy for Longer Bertolli, Flora/Becel If I’m going to live longer, I want to stay fit.
My heart, my body and all my senses need
to stay strong. If I take care of my body, my
long-term health will take care of itself.
Look Better Slim Fast If I look better, I feel better. So I’m searching
for things that will help me manage my
weight, keep me fit and active – and if they
make me look a bit younger, even better!
Feel Good Daily Ben & Jerry’s, Dove I know I can affect my mood by making good
choices, including what I eat. I want things
that will relax my mind, help me sleep well
and generally make me feel good.
Achieve More Lipton, Knorr,
AdeZ
I want to do more, and there’s more pressure
on me to do everything – at work and at
home. I need to boost my physical and
mental energy levels, and recharge my
batteries.
communication (Lien 1993). Here, we will draw from an example of two television
commercials.16
Advertisements can be read as technologies of persuasion as well as technologies
of credibility. Like Dr. Atkins, who presents us with the case of the already
mentioned Stanley Moskowitz, “a vigorous 64-year old sculptor who . . . survived
16 Both television commercials are part of a single narrative and tell two subsequent parts of a story. Both
commercials can be found online for viewing purposes. See <http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=pRMDZvq8-
NY> for part 1, (last accessed March 2, 2010), and <http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=bTMmHY49uR4> for
part 2 (last accessed March 2, 2010).
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three heart attacks” (Atkins 1994, 16), Unilever presents us with Karin, a 48-year old
singer/performer, overweight and living a hectic life, who learns that, as a result of
menopause, her cholesterol level has increased. Karin is a Dutch celebrity. We are
presented with at least two small stories in 30-second blocks. In the first story Karin,
who believes that she is going through menopause in excellent health, is led to be unsure
about her cholesterol levels. In the second story she has learned that her cholesterol
needs to be lowered and has decided to do so by using Flora/Becel proActiv products.
We are shown that she doesn’t even need to change her lifestyle significantly to reach
her goal of lowered cholesterol. On the Becel website, Karin explains it herself: “I
didn’t know anything about menopause . . . . That I may have a higher risk of high
cholesterol during menopause, I never heard about that, and neither did my friends.”17
Unilever – via Karin Bloemen and the approved claim – links a social concern
(high cholesterol) to a daily food-product (Flora/Becel). Instead of directly addressing
a particular group or public, a public is formed rather through the connection of
high-cholesterol with menopause and the desire to live longer and healthier (in the
first commercial). This then is connected to phytosterols in margarine (in the second
commercial). The life goals, in other words, are used by Unilever to create an issue, and
with this issue, a public (Marres 2007). Issue and public are subsequently connected
to the product while Karin Bloemen can be considered the vector to establish that
connection.
A display of “cases” of well-known individuals, in commercials and throughout
corporate communication and marketing, allows for a “metaphorical extension”
(Shapin 2007) onto oneself. Karin Bloemen, the main character is well-known to
the Dutch audience. Her approximate age is known and so are, for instance, details
of her lifestyle, weight, and political affiliation. This particular marketing campaign is
specifically directed at women in menopause: “As a result of the changes in your body
during menopause, chances rise that you will have heightened cholesterol.”18 The focus
on first person and second person narratives is meant to facilitate this metaphorical
extension. The “I” and “you” do not signify the average Dutchman or European. They
represent women in menopause or who are concerned about entering menopause and
who can identify with Karin Bloemen. However, not everybody can identify with
this Dutch diva. For that reason, parallel cases are shown on TV: men and women
in other age categories with different professions, accompanied by different narratives.
These cases are positioned in such a way that, through metaphorical extension, they
correspond to all (or most) members of the target audience.
17 This text fragment was drawn from the Unilever website <http://www.becel.nl/Consumer/
Article.aspx?Path=Consumer/CholesterolAdvice/LoweringYourCholesterol/30dagenMinidrinkactie> (last ac-
cessed November 26, 2008; translated by Bart Penders).
18 This text fragment was drawn from the Unilever website <http://www.becel.nl/Consumer/
CampaignArticle.aspx?Path=Consumer/CholesterolAdvice/TippingPointCampaign/Home&Campaign=
true> (last accessed November 25, 2008; translated by Bart Penders).
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Karin is certain about her need to act upon her cholesterol levels. She is not distracted
by possible heterogeneous evidence about how to influence cholesterol levels, effects
of diverse sorts of fatty acids, plant sterols and stanols, and much more. Her narrative
is a homogeneous message along the lines of Unilever’s life goal model: If I take
care of my body, my long-term health will take care of itself. Such homogeneity,
as Ronteltap (2008) explains, aids acceptance: “although not good for scientific
progression, consensus . . . is desirable from the perspective of consumer acceptance.”
Unilever is awarded credit for helping people like Karin to live a healthier life. The
homogenous message and the possibility to metaphorically extend from Karin to
many other women is rewarded with recognition. Unilever itself reports that “80 per
cent of Dutch women now know that there is a direct link between the menopause
and cholesterol levels. At the start of the campaign this was less than 20 per cent”
(Unilever 2009a). The “Brand Momentum” monitor of the Euro RSCG advertising
agency reported the Karin Bloemen campaign to have generated the highest “consumer
momentum” in the food category.19
Commercials promoting Flora/Becel proActiv do mobilize scientific evidence to
show such products have an effect on cholesterol. The product package reports
data about the amounts of calories, fatty acids, and phytostyroles. Many scientific
claims surround Flora/Becel proActiv and Karin Bloemen in the public domain:
these are the claims that have been approved by EFSA. Their regulatory approval
(or scientific opinion) helps generate homogeneity in the marketplace and restricting
heterogeneity to the scientific realm. In the margarine marketplace, science cannot
engineer credibility all by itself. It can only help. Perry has demonstrated that activists
in infrastructural debates, combine science with alternative credibility engineering
strategies. If science doesn’t suffice, or is unable to create an advantage, professionals
seek out new trajectories: “at the same time, they exploit personal identities and
embodied subjectivities as additional sources of authenticity and credibility” (Perry
et al. 2007). Credibility engineering is a process that includes multiple publics. When
these publics are consumers, science takes up a different, secondary role. Credibility
engineering among consumers does not take the same cyclical shape as the credit cycle
in academia (see figure 3, sales do not simply feed back into new approved health
claims).
19 Per season (summer 2008), as compared to other A brands. “Consumer momentum” or “Net Momentum” is
defined as follows: “Respondents are confronted with a large amount of brands. [This] will lead to brand specific
scores. The current strength of a brand, as perceived by the respondents, is expressed in the ‘Net Momentum’. The
higher the Net Momentum, the better the brand performance.” The Brand Momentum is published regularly
on <http://www.brandmomentum.nl/>, the particular measurement I refer to, describing Becel/Flora’s “Net
Momentum” can be found at <http://www.brandmomentum.nl/research_3_category_5.html> (last accessed
April 6, 2009).
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Fig. 3. Credibility engineering among consumers. This scheme shows a process usually
identified as marketing. Approved health claims are mobilized, as well as particular individuals
who are selected for their possibility to metaphorically extend across others. Prestige is
engineered, but in radically different ways. The dotted line towards “sales” indicates that other
factors, including but not restricted to the financial situation of the consumer or the availability
of competing products with similar claims, co-determine whether sales will increase.
7. Tying corporate science, regulation, and marketing together
Thus far, we have described three related activities within Unilever: the production
of credibility among scientific peers, the translation of this credibility into regulatory
approval, and the production of credibility among potential consumers. We have shown
that these activities – science, regulation and marketing – are often closely connected
to one another. However, this is not always the way in which they are being portrayed.
For instance, academia and “the market” have regularly been described as a battlefield
(e.g. Lien 1997; Long and Long 1992). Science, in this view, deals with universal
truths while marketing is connected to personal preferences and the art of persuasion.
Science is methodologically sound and marketing is not. While the actors starring
at these fronts, academic researchers, and regulators at one end of the spectrum, and
potential consumers at the other, demand a different logic, a different message, and
different channels for communication, they also heavily depend on one another since
the engineering of credibility among both – as we have tried to show in the credibility
circle for Unilever – is closely intertwined.
While credibility engineering directed at consumers and credibility engineering
directed at peers and regulators may often be staged as separate processes, within
Unilever the boundary between them is quite permeable. This we say on the basis of
our own study and analyses but people working in Unilever also say this rather directly.
As one of the Unilever core team leaders argues: “If you want to take your project
away from being solely about science, then you will have to look at a communication
strategy. What do you want to publish, both in- and outside of science? What do
you want to tell to whom?” (Interview V2, 20090316). This team leader champions
an integrated process of credibility management in which consumers, regulators, and
scientists, alongside many others, are addressed side by side whereby knowledge, issues,
publics, and credibility among both are constructed in parallel.
An interesting illustration of the parallel strategy of connecting science, regulation,
and marketing, is Unilever’s “Strategy for Indirect Communication.” This strategy was,
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889711000202
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit Maastricht, on 22 Sep 2021 at 07:22:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
506 Bart Penders and Annemiek P. Nelis
for example, used in the preparation for developing and launching the margarine spread
“Blue Band Idea” (Unilever 2007). The strategy provided an integrated approach to
the question who should be convinced of what message or claim. As such, the strategy
dealt with getting a certain message to a large variety of actors, ranging from scientists
to consumers.
The primary consumer was, in the case of Blue Band Idea, the mother. The message
to be communicated to her was to make her aware of the importance of education and
learning and what a product like Blue Band Idea can add to this process (“awareness,
credibility, and education”). The primary goal was articulated as follows: “To build
credibility for nutritional benefit of [Blue Band Idea].” The strategy featured television
commercials, mothers and their surroundings; as well scientists, policymakers, and many
more who were actors. Unilever’s strategy for indirect communication asked “Who
influences a mother about healthy nutrition and mental development of her children?”
and answered this question20 by presenting an elaborate network of influencers grouped
as internal (private life contacts) and external (formal contacts). The network included,
but was not limited to day care, schools, teachers, other children, books, advertisements,
direct mail, general practitioners, books, psychologists, self-help groups, the internet,
parent magazines, her own mother, peer mothers, dieticians, the government and
governmental bodies, European health organization, national and European nutrition
councils, neuro- and nutrition scientists, and many more. All of these actors presented
channels for indirect communication of the product characteristics and claims, the
credibility of those claims and the credibility of Unilever itself (see fig. 4).
The indirect communication strategy illustrates how the three processes that we
have described so far – credibility engineering among scientists, among regulators, and
among consumers, e.g. science and marketing – come together. These processes feed
one another with capital and knowledge. Figure 5 presents a schematic impression of
how they are connected.
The connection between the displayed parallel cycles is closely monitored by
Unilever itself, but also by external experts. Within Unilever, experts operating at the
intersection of science and the marketplace are known as key opinion formers (KOFs).
A KOF is a public figure who operates in the boundary zone between science and the
market place. KOFs include policymakers, scholars, and scientists. To academics, they
are important sources for the societal orientation of science. To consumers, exchanges
and discussions between Unilever and KOFs are accessible sources of information. In
other words, KOFs critically compare parallel credibility engineering processes and
report misfits. For instance, a highly visible KOF is the Dutch nutrition scientist
20 As part of our research, we requested the file ourselves. Our non-disclosure agreement with Unilever acted as
a backstage pass and we were given access. Due to its confidential character, we include no substantial segments
here.
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Fig. 4. Who influences a mother about healthy nutrition and mental development of their
children? In the communication strategy, the central target in communication is reached via a
variety of channels, directly via advertising and indirectly via science. Redrawn and simplified
by BP from the Unilever Indirect Communication Strategy. Only a subset of the original nodes
is shown. Due to portrait rights, the photograph has been replaced by that of APN.
Martijn Katan.21 Within Unilever, Katan is repeatedly identified as one of their
KOFs (Observation V7, 20081110, Interview V2, 20081006, and Observation V1,
20080415). Amongst his peers he is held in the highest esteem while he also publishes
for the lay public (see e.g. Katan 2008). Katan’s popular science writings are closely
followed and monitored by Unilever scientists. However, Unilever also communicates
21 Amongst his peers he is held in the highest esteem and he has recently published a book for the lay public
(Katan 2008). In this book he discusses the heterogeneity of nutritional expertise by discussing how science
works: “at the front of science, there is chaos and contradiction” (ibid., 13) or “ask someone what healthy
food is and 99 out of a 100 times you will get a firm answer. The one who doesn’t know for sure, may be a
nutritionist” (ibid., 11). In response to this heterogeneity, Katan claims that anything is good as long as you don’t
eat too much of it. His attempt to deal with heterogeneity fits within an idealist modern tradition in which the
validity of a claim is considered to be the only relevant determinant of its credibility (Shapin 1995).
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Fig. 5. The cycle of credibility expanded. Credibility engineering among peers, as well as
among consumers are densely interconnected. The connections between the two are not
articulated prominently. This double cycle is the integration or the merger of figures 2 and 3,
that between credibility engineering among nutrition science and among consumers.
intensively with KOFs like Katan. As one of the R&D directors illustrates: “If Martijn
Katan writes something in a newspaper which we do not fully agree with, we will just
give him a ring” (Observation V1, 20080814).22
Credibility engineering by Unilever is a practice in which science, regulation, and
marketing meet, in which scientists, regulators, and consumers are addressed side by
side and in which scientific facts and persuasive strategies are mobilized alongside one
another, and in which universal claims are made personal.23 The strict boundary which
is often thought to exist between science and marketing is highly permeable and it is
traversed regularly, although not so easily.
22 However, disagreements between KOFs and Unilever may contribute to the heterogeneity which Shapin has
argued may lead to a public “unconcern” – a disinterest which, especially in the case of matters concerning
health, may be detrimental (Shapin 2007).
23 Another way to think about this is in terms of the Mertonian norm of universalism. Scientists ideally gauge
the credibility of a scientific claim not based on who is making it (particularistic criteria), but on the merit of
the empirical or theoretical claim alone (universal criteria). Unilever does this through scientific accreditation
processes (universal), but gathers further credibility with a different (non-science) approach which is very
particularistic. In essence, linking the universal and the particularistic mechanisms of producing credibility into
a single, holistic marketing campaign is more powerful than either alone.
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8. Discussion
In the previous paragraphs we have described the process of “credibility engineering”
in the corporation Unilever. As we have shown, this process differs in a number of
respects from credibility engineering in science. In science, scientific peers are the main
source from which to gain credibility and it is they who attribute credits to one’s ideas
and knowledge. To Unilever, there are no less than three sources from which to gain
credibility and together these contribute to the credibility of (new) products: scientific
peers, regulators, and consumers.
Our focus on Unilever has enriched our understanding of what knowledge
production and credibility engineering mean in this particular private industry. But
what does this study tell us about credibility engineering in private industry in general?
To what extent is the credibility cycle that we produced for Unilever able to represent
and explain credibility engineering in other industries? How does our argument apply
to other industries and what does it imply for other practices?
As we indicated in the introduction, there are only few scholars who address
knowledge production in corporate science. As a result of this, there are few resources
to help answer the question if and how our extended credibility cycle reflects
overall credibility engineering in private industry. A prominent exception is Sergio
Sismondo, who has, among other things, studied scientific knowledge production in
the pharmaceutical industry. From the work of Sismondo we learn that credibility
engineering in the pharmaceutical industry does not necessarily compare to credibility
engineering within Unilever or the food industry.
In contrast to what we saw within Unilever, pharmaceutical companies today
outsource a lot of their scientific work, essentially buying scientific authority and
credibility through ghost authorship strategies (Sismondo 2009a). Most of this work
is handled by contract research organizations that are made up of planners and
planning teams: “the data that is being produced is typically analyzed by pharmaceutical
companies statisticians, papers are written by medical writers, and the whole process
is guided and shepherded through to publication by planners and planning teams”
(ibid., 172). Papers are produced under the name of one or more medical specialists,
preferably, key opinion leaders (KOLs): “The KOLs are valuable to the credibility of
the manuscript and therefore essential to the whole project of publication planning.
. . . Planners can work to create authors out of KOLs” (ibid., 187). The work of the
employees of the contract research organization, such as the statisticians and medical
writers, however, rarely gets mentioned in journal publications and other output.
For this reason, Sismondo argues, “we might see publication planning as the ‘ghost
management’ of medical research” (ibid.).
Sismondo describes two separate worlds responsible for academic publishing in
the pharmaceutical industry: professional planners and medical or clinical specialists.
He shows that professional planners do a lot to maintain their credibility as honest
professionals. Planners are well aware of the sensitivities that guide their work. As one
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of them says to Sismondo: “We really do like to stress that the publication planning
company is not an advertising agency, is not a PR agency, even though it might look
like one” (ibid., 179). Planners understand that their work has marketing value and
that it is exactly for that value that their work is supported. However, they see a
clear distinction between their own work and that of marketing people. Marketing,
according to planners, “would consistently ride roughshod over scientific standards,
and in particular be relatively unconcerned with what the scientific data can support”
(ibid., 181) rather than apply to good publication practice. “A publication plan is a basis
for dissemination for scientific and clinical data and is ‘not a marketing communications
plan’” (ibid.).
If we compare how the pharmaceutical sector aims to generate credibility for its
(scientific) results and its products with what we have learned from Unilever, we
encounter some substantial differences. First, both deal with different consumers. First,
in both cases we see a different division of labor and different dependencies between
the “specialties” of science and of marketing. Second, making use of external parties –
such as CROs and publication planners – to organize part of the credibility process,
makes this process less transparent.24
In both examples – food and pharma – we encounter different customers. In the
pharmaceutical industry, credibility engineering is directed to one audience: medical
professionals. They are the gatekeeper between the pharmaceutical industry and
patients or citizens and thus the audience of both marketers and scientists. Within
the food industry products are being marketed directly to (potential) consumers and
citizens. For medical professionals, peer-review is an important indicator and thus will
be used in marketing strategies. Peer reviewed literature, however, is not a way to
reach consumers and citizens and cannot directly act as a marketing tool in Unilever’s
marketing strategy. The links between marketing and R&D as described by Sismondo
are exclusive to the pharmaceutical industry (Sismondo 2007, 2009a, 2010), whereas
the interaction between marketing and R&D we observed in Unilever (and Lehenkari
observed with Raiso) probably is more specific for consumer-industries. Thus, both
sectors differ significantly in their credibility strategies and what counts as a product
that is trusted (i.e. having the status of being credible) and sold.
The dependencies between science and marketing differ. In both cases, scientific
publications that support certain ideas or knowledge are needed to gain credit for a
particular product. Nevertheless, the food industry and the pharmaceutical industry
differ in terms of how the publication process is organized. In pharmacy, the production
of scientific papers is being orchestrated by contract research organizations. Credibility
engineering among scientists, so it seems, is diverted, outsourced, or disconnected
from marketing activities. As the quotes from the scientific planners illustrate, these
24 No doubt, if we were to do a more extensive comparison between the two industries, we would probably
come up with even more differences. For example, the way in which the regulatory regime is organized also
asks for further exploration.
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planners see a sharp distinction between themselves and the marketing people. In
the eyes of the planners, marketing people are prepared to sell anything. In the
pharmaceutical industry, there is little connection between the strategies of the external
planner and the marketing people. In the case of Unilever, however, science and
marketing are very much part of the same process whereby both people and strategy
are intertwined and connected.25 An exemplar of this we find in Unilever’s Strategy
for Indirect Communication (paragraph 7). This strategy brings together different
audiences (consumers, regulators, KOFs, scientists, and policymakers) and sources that
may acclaim their products.
Making use of external parties to organize part of the credibility process, makes this
process less transparent. Both pharmaceutical industry and food companies produce
scientific articles claiming credibility for their novel products and the science behind
these new products. However, in pharmaceutical companies this work is done by
ghost-writers and hidden workers. In Unilever this is done by the company’s own
scientists. The latter process therefore seems more transparent than it is in pharma.
The pharmaceutical sector hosts a hidden workforce that is neither mentioned nor
credited for the work they do. While professional planners do the work, KOLs get
the credit. Here, the KOLs are not used as sources of expertise, but rather as sources
of authority, sought after to endorse rather than to contribute or critique corporate
science.26
Of course, there are also similarities between the pharmaceutical companies and
Unilever. Elements of the novel model of science Sismondo described in his paper
overlap with observations we have made during our study of Unilever R&D: the
high commercial stakes, the size of the workforce, and the much broader networks
of professionals actively involved in knowledge production. Also, the motives for
producing scientific publications are comparable. When we look at the extended
credibility cycle, it is questionable to what extent an analyses of the pharmaceutical
industry would lead to a similar cycle.
25 It is, however, important to consider that in two countries, namely New Zealand and the United States, direct
to consumer (DTC) marketing of pharmaceuticals is allowed. As a result, in those two countries, credibility
engineering may resemble the dynamic described in this paper a lot more than the one described by Sismondo.
For instance, Busfield 2006 discusses the sociological strategies for “fact-making” for DTC marketing through
clinical trial data and Conrad 2005 positions DTC advertising as part of the medicalization engine that is the
pharmaceutical industry.
26 Studying corporations and their ways of knowledge production invites critical normative positions. For
example, after Sismondo described how the medical writing industry intertwined marketing and research
into new drugs (Sismondo 2009a), he was immediately criticized by his own peers for not condemning the
pharmaceutical sector for this and for not accusing them of improper science (McHenry 2009). He responds by
demonstrating that the practice described in his paper exposes choices and decisions made, but that it need not
be considered bad or faulty science (Sismondo 2009b). This does not exclude Sismondo from harshly criticizing
these choices elsewhere (Sismondo and Doucet 2010).
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What we have shown here is that credibility engineering is an integrated endeavor
and that it consists of a single, expanded credibility cycle27 and that indeed “research
does not have an intrinsic value that automatically confers credibility” (Lehenkari 2003,
520). In fact, amongst the many and difficult translations that take place during the
engineering of credibility, only a modest role is reserved for science. In the words of
Knorr Cetina, both we and Lehenkari have been studying transepistemic arenas in which
credibility will have to be tied into local relevance, which can and will be very different
from the ones in R&D and which require continuous maintenance (Knorr Cetina
1982).28
To what extent the local relevance of different private industries compare, is
a question for future research. Different industries may mobilize different sets of
strategies, based upon whether consumers and peers overlap (as they do in pharma),
or the degree of heterogeneity present in the fields they are active in. Especially the
discrepancies between Sismondo’s and our analysis show that credibility engineering is
a worthwhile starting point for a series of social studies of corporate science (Penders
et al. 2009).
9. Conclusion
In this paper we have compared the process of knowledge production in public science
and private industry. In particular, we have focused on the question how knowledge
becomes “credible knowledge,” to whom this “credibility” matters or applies, and
with what effect.
In science, as first shown by Latour and Woolgar, credibility is linked to scientific
authorship and the recognition of one’s work by academic peers. What is “credible”
knowledge is determined by academic peers who show their faith in the credibility of
one’s knowledge and ideas by citing from one’s articles and books. Credit is granted for
knowledge and claims that are new and have not been granted credit before. Through
the distribution of credibility via peers, scientists gain further funding and opportunities
for future research.
In the case of Unilever, not only scientific credibility but also recognition from
regulators and consumers turned out to be important to the process of knowledge
production. Regulators, like peers, give credit to particular claims in light of the
scientific evidence available at a particular moment in time. Here, credit is defined
not by the fact that knowledge is new and not previously credited to other scientists
or groups but by the fact that this knowledge aligns with the scientific consensus. It
has to be, in other words, based on credible knowledge. Consumers, according to the
27 Here, we significantly differ in our analysis from Lehenkari (2000, 2003), who argues that three temporally
and geographically separated cycles can account for the emergence and maintenance of credibility.
28 Like everything that is engineered, without active and careful maintenance, credibility may become vulnerable.
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marketers of Unilever (but also Shapin), are neither primarily interested in the evidence
base of (food) claims nor in the novelty of such claims. Much more, they are interested
how a particular claim fits their personal situation or life-style. How, in other words,
it relates to them individually. What makes a claim “credible” is if it links with an issue
that consumers consider to be their issue.
To accommodate the above, we have extended the credibility cycle with an
additional “loop.” The basic cycle that Latour and Woolgar describe and that represents
the production of new knowledge and getting credit for this knowledge, in essence, in
Unilever is hardly different from processes in academic science. In addition, there is an
additional loop that represents the acquiring of credibility from regulators, to match
claims with accredited knowledge and to represent the involvement of customers in
the credibility process of a product or claim.
Most of all, what we have shown to be specific to Unilever, compared to Sismondo’s
pharmaceutical industry, is that obtaining credibility from scientific peers, regulators,
and consumers is one and the same process. Unilever’s communication strategy and
also the way the company organizes its work processes includes the development,
marketing, and sales of new knowledge and products. As a result, the credibility of
Unilever’s products, in general, are determined by the weakest link in the credibility
circle. Sometimes that is science and sometimes it isn’t. Credibility engineering, in
other words, is “big business.”
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